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NOTES
Clear as Mud: How Heldermon v. Wright Missed an
Opportunity to Clarify Oklahoma’s Murky Water Law
I. Introduction
Perhaps long ago Mark Twain put it best when he said: “[w]hiskey is for
drinking, water is for fighting over.”   Twain’s words remain true today as1
rights to water are becoming a contentious issue all over the United States,2
with Oklahoma being no exception.  Further complicating matters is
Oklahoma’s murky water law, currently encumbered by perceived
constitutional infirmities of the statutory system of appropriative rights, which
was implemented to replace an outdated common law regime.
Historically, Oklahoma has employed two different systems for managing
the use of natural flowing water:  common law riparianism and prior
appropriations.   The riparian doctrine operates to “confer[] upon the owner of3
land contiguous to a watercourse the right to the reasonable and beneficial use
of water on his land.”   In contrast, the prior appropriations doctrine does not4
require a water user to own riparian land and determines rights by
appropriation permits acquired on a “first in time, first in right” basis.5
Evident inconsistencies between the two systems led the Oklahoma legislature
to attempt to limit common law riparian rights in promotion of an
appropriations system.   Nevertheless, the legislature’s efforts to abrogate6
riparian rights have been hindered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision
in Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board,7
which identified perceived constitutional infirmities within the appropriations
statutes.  The perceived infirmities, as defined by Franco-American, are rooted
in the idea that limiting common law riparian rights may constitute a taking of
personal property without just compensation.   In contrast, the dissent in8
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11. 2006 OK 86, 152 P.3d 855.
12. Id. ¶ 16, 152 P.3d at 860 (82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.5).
13. Id.
14. Heldermon v. Wright, No. 100709, 2006 OK CIV APP, ¶ 13 (Mar. 9, 2006), vacated,
2006 OK 86, 152 P.3d 855.
Franco-American argued that the legislative limitation imposed on riparian
rights is constitutionally within the state’s police power.   The legislature,9
siding with the Franco-American dissent, responded in 1993 by enacting
legislative amendments allowing the appropriations system to stay the
course.   Nonetheless, for the last thirteen years, Franco-American has10
remained unchallenged by subsequent litigation, resulting in the muddying of
Oklahoma water law.
In Heldermon v. Wright,  the Oklahoma Supreme Court had an opportunity11
to rule on the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments, potentially clarifying
Oklahoma water law.  Unfortunately, the court elected to sidestep the issue by
reading into existing statutory language an implied requirement that notice of
a water rights adjudication be given to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
(OWRB) in all water rights adjudications.   As a result of the parties’ failure12
to give the previously unspecified notice, the court left the constitutional
question for another day.   Given that the Court of Civil Appeals’ ruling13
below expressly brought into question the constitutionality of the 1993
amendments,  the course of action by the Oklahoma Supreme Court14
represents a squandered opportunity to provide clarity and stability to
Oklahoma water law.  
This note will analyze the Heldermon decision in four pertinent parts.  Part
II will provide a review of Oklahoma law on water use.  Part III will discuss
the facts, issue, holding, and decision in Heldermon.  Part IV will conduct an
in-depth analysis of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Heldermon,
discussing the court’s missed opportunity, how the court’s holding may
indicate future decisions on the issue, and the consequences—both pragmatic
and economic—that will follow from the court’s “non-holding.”  Part V will
briefly look at how other states have handled the constitutional arguments
against the appropriations system and will propose that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court should abandon its ruling in Franco-American because the legislature’s
restriction of common law riparian rights constituted a valid exercise of the
state’s police power.  This note concludes with Part VI.
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II. Water Law Preceding Heldermon—A Cry for Constitutional Clarity
Historically, the United States has employed “two great systems . . . that
govern the acquisition, enjoyment, and transfer of property rights to use
water.”   The eastern states, possessing a more “humid” environment, follow15
the common law riparian system, while the “arid” western states have
necessarily created and employed the prior appropriations system.   However,16
semiarid states such as Oklahoma  have occasionally used a dual system17
employing aspects of both riparianism and appropriations.18
A. In with Riparianism
As it is commonly used, “[t]he term ‘riparian rights’ indicates a bundle of
rights that turn on the physical relationship of a body of water to the land
abutting it.”   More specifically, riparianism establishes that an abutting19
landowner enjoys a “usufructary right in the water rather than . . . ownership
of the water as such.”   Originally a common law doctrine, riparianism was20
first introduced in Oklahoma by the Organic Act of 1890 when Congress
extended English common law to Indian Territory.   Thus, a “landowner [was21
permitted to] use water running in a definite natural stream over or under the
surface of his land, but . . . he [could] not prevent the natural flow of the
stream . . . .”   This form of riparianism still remains today with some22
qualifying provisions.   23
Although riparianism was an established doctrine in Oklahoma, the state
“quickly found that while riparianism worked well in [some areas of the]
United States . . . the arid [regions] needed more access to water than
riparianism allowed.”   Consequently, in 1897, only seven years after the24
introduction of riparianism in Oklahoma, the first signs of an appropriations
system began to appear.   The legislature, concerned about the arid sections25
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30. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 1946 OK 252, ¶ 12, 172 P.2d 1002, 1005 (quoting
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of the state, chose to provide “for the appropriation . . . of stream water for the
irrigation of [arid regions].”   Initially though, water could not be appropriated26
without the consent of riparian landowners.    As a result, it appeared that the27
systems would coexist harmoniously.  Beneath the surface, however, the lack
of conflict between the two systems may have been a product of the
judiciary.   Few water use cases came before the courts, and those presented28
to the courts were usually resolved by refining the riparian system to make it
more useful or interpreting the appropriations statutes in a manner
discouraging their use.   The “reasonable use” standard first evolved from29
these cases and established that “[a]s between different riparian owners each
one is limited to a reasonable use, with due regard to the rights and necessities
of others interested.”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court held it was “the right30
of all to have the stream substantially preserved in its natural size, flow and
purity, and protected against material diversion or pollution.”   Therefore,31
riparian landowners enjoyed a substantial and, in some situations almost
unlimited, right to the use of water from a definite stream.  At this time, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had recognized such use as a private property right,
protected by any and all instrumentalities that may be employed to effectuate
such a right.   Although “protected against material diversion” sounds in32
direct conflict with any appropriation of water, this dual system appeared to
adequately address the water rights issues in Oklahoma.  Nevertheless, as
Professor Allison aptly stated, “[c]ontradictions in dual rights systems do not
create desire for change until conflicts between riparian and appropriators
emerge.”   33
In 1955, Wells A. Hutchins introduced the book The Oklahoma Law of
Water Rights, “which graphically identified flaws in Oklahoma’s dual water
rights system” and sparked a “movement . . . to amend the Water Code so it
could better facilitate economic development.”   Hutchins’s idea was to adopt34
a system to “encourage, among other things, urban growth . . . by giving local
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(2001)).
41. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.1(2) (2001).
42. Allison, supra note 3, at 16.
“Predictability” could benefit the local government by allowing them “to
appropriate water for municipal use[s] without fearing that a riparian [would]
later claim the [use of that water].”   Thus, while the Oklahoma judiciary36
favored riparianism as its first born, the legislature was primed for
implementing the appropriations system to combat these economic concerns.
B. In With Prior Appropriations . . . For Now
Faced with the significant economic deficiencies of the dual system,  the37
legislature took action.  Joseph F. Rarick, Professor of Law at the University
of Oklahoma, was one of the most notable individuals in the push for water
law reform in Oklahoma.   Professor Rarick’s most influential endeavor may38
have been his work with two legislative drafting committees to shape the
substance of Oklahoma’s solution to these economic problems.   In 1963,39
heeding the advice of these Rarick-led drafting committees, the legislature
enacted the following statute:
The owner of the land owns the water standing thereon, or flowing
over or under its surface but not forming a definite stream . . .
Water running in a definite stream, formed by nature over or under
the surface, may be used by him for domestic purposes . . . as long
as it remains there, but he may not prevent the natural flow of the
stream, or of the natural spring from which it commences its
definite course, nor pursue or pollute the same, as such water then
becomes public water and is subject to appropriation for the
benefit and welfare of the people of the State, as provided by
law . . . .40
The statute further defined “domestic use” as “the use of water by a natural
individual or by a family or household for household purposes, for farm and
domestic animals up to the normal grazing capacity . . .” ; thus, it was clear41
this new law could be a restriction on “reasonable use” riparian rights.
Nevertheless, to allow the riparian system to continue with its broad scope of
reasonable use would be to “subvert the goal of creating a unitary system” to
encourage economic growth.   To transition into the new system, the42
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committees found it best to subject all existing water uses, riparian or
appropriative, to judicial determinations as to whether or not the use was a
vested right.   If the court deemed the use “beneficial,” the use was considered43
“vested” and the user would receive an appropriation permit with a specific
priority date associated with it.   The only non-domestic uses regarded as44
lawful were those carried out under a permit obtained through this process.45
The downfall of this system was that the OWRB was only required to provide
mail notice of the judicial determinations to persons who had previously
attempted to affect an appropriation permit before 1963.   Thus, riparian46
owners who had not sought a permit prior to 1963 likely did not receive notice
and, consequently, did not know to petition for a vested right.  Likewise, the
standards for assigning priorities to the new permits did not favor the
riparian.   These standards contained forfeiture limitations where there had47
been a period of non-use for two successive years prior to the 1963
amendments.   Riparianism has no associated non-use limitations, thus48
riparian rights owners were more likely to forfeit their rights because of non-
use.49
Oklahoma was not alone in these developments, as most dual system states
were faced with reforming their inherently divergent water law regimes.50
“[T]he problem with abolishing or limiting riparian rights is that it must be
done in a manner that does not result in an unconstitutional taking of the
riparian interest.”   Several states have tackled this issue, the first being51
Oregon in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.52
The ultimate result in Oregon was that the only riparian rights that survived
were those that “‘vested’ before the effective date of the state appropriation
act, with only claims to water acquired by appropriation recognized after the
effective date of the act.”   The Oregon Supreme Court obviously understood53
the new appropriations system to be constitutional and acknowledged that its
mode of practice was not a taking without just compensation.  Other dual
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/5
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61. Id. ¶ 2, 855 P.2d at 571 (emphasis added).
system states followed suit in nearly identical fashion, including Kansas,54
South Dakota,  and Texas,  all of which upheld statutes comparable to the55 56
1963 Oklahoma statute.   Despite the dramatic changes and restrictions57
imposed on common law riparian rights, Oklahoma did not immediately face
the constitutional challenges that other dual system states had addressed.
Then, after nearly thirty years of being unchallenged, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court changed everything.
C. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources
Board—Against the Current
In 1980, the City of Ada sent Oklahoma’s water use system into a
constitutional tailspin.  Following an area drought in 1980, the City of Ada
applied for a near threefold increase of its appropriated water from Byrd’s Mill
Spring.   Such a dramatic increase in appropriative permits to the City58
inevitably caused riparian owners to object.   After an administrative decision59
by the OWRB to scale back the requested amount, then to grant the
appropriations permit, certain riparian owners appealed to the District Court
of Coal County.   Eventually the case appeared before the Oklahoma Supreme60
Court, finally putting the court in a position to rule on the 1963 amendments.
Going against the precedential current of most other western states, the court
steered the opposite direction of economic development.  Finding that the
“Oklahoma riparian owner enjoys a vested common-law right to the
reasonable use of the stream,” the court held that this right was “part of [a]
property owner’s ‘bundle of sticks’ and may not be taken for public use
without compensation.”   More specifically, the court held that the 196361
amendments were “fraught with a constitutional infirmity [because] they
abolish the right of riparian owners to assert their . . . reasonable use of the
stream [and] because [the amendments] fall short of an express abrogation of
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a riparian owner’s common-law right.”   As a result, the court sent62
Oklahoma’s water law swirling back into the murky waters of the dual rights
regime, stating that “the statutory right to appropriate stream water coexists
with, but does not preempt or abrogate, the riparian owner’s common-law
right.”   63
Aware of what was taking place in the courts, the legislature was already in
action.  Although the Franco-American opinion was readopted and reissued
in its final form in 1993, the legislature had already amended title 60, section
60 of the Oklahoma Statutes to expressly abrogate common law riparianism.64
In further response to the court’s holding in Franco-American, the legislature
disclaimed common law riparian rights in 1993 by enacting title 82, section
105.1A stating:
It is the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature that the purpose of
Section 105.1 through Section 105.32 of this title is to provide for
stability and certainty in water rights by replacing the incompatible
dual systems of riparian and appropriative water rights which
governed the use of water from definite streams in Oklahoma prior
to June 10, 1963, with an appropriation system of regulation
requiring the beneficial use of water and providing that priority in
time shall give the better right.  These sections are intended to
provide that riparian landowners may use water for domestic uses
and store water in definite streams and that appropriations shall not
interfere with such domestic uses, to recognize through
administrative adjudications all uses, riparian and appropriative,
existing prior to June 10, 1963, and to extinguish future claims to
use water, except for domestic use, based only on ownership of
riparian lands.65
In addition to this vigorous rejection of the Franco-American holding, the
legislature also enacted another statute  referencing the domestic use66
limitations imposed by title 60, section 60 and title 82, section 105.1A.  These
developments all but ensured that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would have
another opportunity to provide certainty in Oklahoma’s water management
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/5
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67. 2006 OK 86, 152 P.3d 855.
68. Id. ¶ 2, 152 P.3d at 856-57.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 2, 152 P.3d at 856.
71. Id. ¶ 3, 152 P.3d at 857.
72. Id. ¶ 4, 152 P.3d at 857.
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 5, 152 P.3d at 857.
75. Id. ¶ 5, 152 P.3d at 858.
system by addressing the legislature’s insistent intentions to depart from
riparianism.  This opportunity materialized in Heldermon v. Wright.67
III.  Heldermon v. Wright
A. Facts
Landowners Danny Wright and Teddy Neal Heldermon both own land
along an unnamed stream in Caddo County, Oklahoma.   The unnamed stream68
flows northward in Caddo County, through Heldermon’s property and into the
Canadian River.   The dispute arose when Wright, an upstream land owner,69
began building a dam without first applying for a water appropriations permit
or seeking the OWRB’s approval of the dam.   Heldermon, a downstream70
owner, filed a petition in the Caddo County District Court seeking to enjoin
further construction of the dam.   Wright then applied for and obtained a71
permit from the OWRB to build the dam, but not a permit to appropriate the
water.   In response, Heldermon “recast the issue as one to determine [his] and72
Wright’s competing rights to the unnamed stream’s water.”   Heldermon73
presented three alternative theories for determining the extent of his rights:
first, he was entitled to the natural stream flow; second, he was entitled to the
reasonable use of the stream under the Franco-American application; or third,
he was entitled to domestic use as defined and used in title 82 of the Oklahoma
Statutes.   Wright argued that, according to the Franco-American rule, his use74
was reasonable so long as the plaintiffs could not show that they were
substantially harmed by his use, that the plaintiff’s rights were limited to
domestic use as defined by title 82, and that he was only accountable for
releasing water sufficient for the plaintiff’s domestic needs.   The Heldermon75
parties’ arguments demonstrate the lack of clarity in Oklahoma water law, as
both plaintiff and defendant asserted arguments rooted in both riparian rights
and appropriations statutes.  Ironically, neither plaintiff nor defendant argued
that any statute governing water law in Oklahoma was unconstitutional.
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76. Heldermon v. Wright, No. CJ-2003-53 (Caddo Co. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 21, 2004).
77. Id.
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B. Procedural Posture
Applying title 82, sections 105.1 and 105.1A as the controlling law, the trial
court held the appropriations system to be the governing system, ultimately
finding that Heldermon was entitled to only his domestic use of the stream
water.   Upon this basis and with the aid of expert testimony, the court then76
held that Wright must release a minimum of 515 gallons of water per minute
for Heldermon and other downstream riparian owners to have sufficient water
to satisfy their domestic uses.   Wright appealed to the Oklahoma Court of77
Civil Appeals and, at that time, the first issues of constitutionality arose in the
case.  The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court had
erroneously calculated the plaintiff’s domestic needs and that title 82, sections
105.1A and 105.2(A)  were unconstitutional under the Franco-American rule.78
Although neither party had argued this position, the court ruled that:  “As §
60’s companion statutes, §§105.1A and 105.2(A) of the Act similarly limit the
riparian owner to ‘domestic use.’  Accordingly, this same holding that § 60
violates Art. 2, § 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution, to which we are bound,
also applies to those statutes.”   Although the court of appeals held that the79
statutes are unconstitutional and, consequently, that the trial court improperly
labeled the uses as “domestic uses,” they affirmed because the trial court
considered uses that were nonetheless considered “‘reasonable use[s]’ . . .
protected from statutory limitation in Franco-American.”80
C. Decision of the Court
After granting certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court avoided all issues
of constitutionality.  Upon determining the dispositive issue to be whether or
not the OWRB should have received notice of the pending action, the court
vacated the Oklahoma Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case to the
trial court.   Focusing on the procedures articulated in title 82, section 105.581
of the Oklahoma Statutes, the court held that section 105.5 required that the
OWRB receive notice of any suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/5
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water.   Title 82, section 105.5 provides in pertinent part that “the Attorney82
General shall intervene on behalf of the state in any suit for the adjudication
of rights to the use of water if notified by the [OWRB] that the public interests
would be best served by such action.”   The court held that the trigger for this83
notification requirement is the adjudication of water rights as defined by title
60, section 60 of the Oklahoma Statutes.   In support of their holding, the84
court stated that the 
[l]egislature clearly anticipated and intended that the OWRB will
have notice of such a suit even though the requirement and method
for giving notice is omitted [because the] statewide comprehensive
plan to oversee the use and protection of the public’s interest in
stream water . . . has provided for the OWRB’s involvement in all
aspects of stream water use . . . .85
The court then outlined the actual process by which this notice would be
administered.  Upon receiving notice of a water rights adjudication from the
plaintiff, the OWRB must determine if the public’s interest would be best
served by intervention in the suit, and if so, the OWRB would instruct the
Attorney General to intervene.   This is rather significant because the court86
goes on to note that “[f]ew public interests are more obvious . . . than the
interest of the public . . . to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it
substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian
of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more
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perfect use.”   Although the court felt it was necessary that “the State be87
allowed to intervene in a suit to protect its interest in preserving the waters
within its borders,” they “save[d] for another day the issue of the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma Stream Water Use Law.”88
IV. Analysis
A. A Squandered Opportunity to Provide Certainty and Stability
Historically, Oklahoma courts have disfavored the appropriations system.89
Prior to the 1963 amendments, “the lack of conflict between riparian
landowners and appropriators . . . may have been a function of the
appropriation system being rendered moribund by judicial interpretations that
made its use difficult, if not impossible . . . .”   Thus, in light of the Franco-90
American decision in 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in
Heldermon to rule procedurally and save the issue of constitutionality “for
another day” may have been its attempt to sustain judicial disfavor for prior
appropriations.  In other words, it may be interpreted as the court’s
unwillingness to reconsider its holding in Franco-American.  This may
foreshadow future court decisions favoring the dual system of old.  The court’s
support for its procedural ruling in Heldermon, however, may also imply a
contrary result.  The court, by requiring notice to the state, albeit through the
OWRB, appeared to take a significant stand for ensuring that all water rights
adjudications represent the public’s interest in water use.  Prior to Heldermon,
title 82, sections 105.1 and 105.1A—both largely at issue in regards to the
constitutionality of the appropriations system—were judicially unchallenged.
Thus, at the time of Heldermon, the appropriations system as administered by
the OWRB represented the status quo for water use regulation in Oklahoma.91
The court’s avoidance of the substantive issues presented in Heldermon could
be interpreted as an attempt to maintain the status quo of the state’s current
water use system until the court faces an ultimate decision to rule one way or
the other.  But even then, the Heldermon court’s logic and language may imply
that courts will continue to employ the appropriations system in Oklahoma.
The court’s logic in Heldermon appears to intertwine itself with the statutes
at the heart of the riparian-appropriations debate.  As ruled by the court in
Heldermon, the “rights” to be adjudicated, requiring notice to the OWRB, are
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derived from title 60, section 60 —the very statute ruled unconstitutional in92
Franco-American and by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in its review of
Heldermon.  Likewise, the court found the necessity for giving the OWRB
notice in such cases was to afford the OWRB the opportunity to “oversee the
use and protection of the public’s interest in stream water.”   The court calls93
this responsibility of the OWRB part of a comprehensive plan to represent the
public’s interest in the use of stream water derived in part from title 60, section
60 and specifically title 82, section 105.1A —both statutes ruled94
unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in its review of
Heldermon.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s language in Heldermon may95
also imply a result favoring the constitutionality of the statutes.  The court
largely supported its procedural holding with a concern for the public’s interest
in stream water use.   Further, the court stated:96
Generally, the public interests will best be served by the Attorney
General’s intervention [on behalf of the OWRB] in suits over rights
to stream water.  ‘Few public interests are more obvious . . . than
the interest of the public . . . to maintain the rivers that are wholly
within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon
them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.’97
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded “that the State [should] be
allowed to intervene in a suit to protect its interest in preserving the waters
within its borders.”   The heart of the argument for appropriations as opposed98
to riparian water use regulation is to promote the “benefit and welfare of the
people of the state.”   Affording notice to the government body representing99
the state’s public interest in stream water use (in this case, the OWRB) implies
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that in the future the court may consider the public’s water needs paramount
to the riparian landowner’s water needs.  It would logically follow that the
court would not rule the appropriations statutes unconstitutional, but would
rather uphold them as the sole process of regulating water use in Oklahoma.
However, the court chose not to rule on these substantive issues, leaving legal
minds to ponder the different interpretations.  Thus, the Heldermon court
squandered an opportunity to provide certainty and stability—perhaps further
muddying Oklahoma water law.
B. Implications of the Heldermon “Non-holding”
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holding in Heldermon will certainly impact
water use law in Oklahoma, both pragmatically and economically.
Pragmatically speaking, now that the court has afforded the OWRB that
opportunity to intervene in all water rights actions, water rights holders will
almost necessarily have to account for the public’s interest when asserting their
own rights.  However, Heldermon’s non-holding may pose significant
implications for the administration of water rights moving forward.  Currently,
water rights are administered through the appropriations system, as facilitated
by the OWRB.   However, according to Franco-American, a holding that the100
Oklahoma Supreme Court has yet to reconsider, the legislature did not
constitutionally abrogate riparian rights.   Under Franco-American, not only101
are common law riparian rights preserved, but a riparian landowner is entitled
to reasonable use,  which can be substantially greater than domestic use.102
The 1993 legislative response to Franco-American, however, afforded the
appropriations system the chance to move forward but may not have
completely overruled Franco-American.   Under the 1993 statutes, riparian103
rights are essentially limited to domestic use “as such water then becomes
public water and is subject to appropriation for the benefit and welfare of the
people of the state.”   Thus, when the OWRB issues appropriative permits to104
applicants seeking beneficial use, they will consider only the domestic needs
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of surrounding riparian landowners.  Anything above domestic needs will be
subject to appropriations by non-riparian water users.  This is even more of an
issue now that the OWRB must receive notice of any adjudication of water
rights.  If a riparian landowner attempts to assert his rights to reasonable use
pursuant to the holding of Franco-American, the OWRB, under legislative
mandate,  will likely intervene in the action, representing the appropriations105
system as the controlling law and limiting riparian rights to domestic uses.106
The outcome of such an action is unknown, which is the reason Oklahoma’s
water law is so murky.  Knowing Franco-American to still be judicially intact,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court further muddied Oklahoma water law by
rendering a procedural decision supported by the very statute Franco-
American ruled unconstitutional, without addressing questions of the
constitutionality of that statute.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s non-holding in Heldermon poses
significant economic implications in addition to pragmatic consequences.  The
non-holding leaves current appropriators, including local municipalities, utility
providers, and certain state industries, uncertain as to whether they must
account for riparian water rights when planning for their own water needs.
“The instability created for all appropriators is particularly troublesome for
municipal water supplies due to the long-term planning and the enormous
capital investment necessary to construct and maintain the municipal
supply.”   Take the largest municipality in Oklahoma as an example:107
“Oklahoma City . . . holds appropriative [water] rights in several Oklahoma
rivers and streams pursuant to permits issued by the State of Oklahoma
through the OWRB.”   Pursuant to these rights “Oklahoma City . . .108
provide[s] water to over 500,000 people for the protection of their health,
safety, and welfare.”   Given the current validity of the Franco-American109
holding and the legislative mandate of title 60, section 60 and title 82, sections
105.1 and 105.1A, the City of Oklahoma City cannot ensure that their
appropriative water rights are secure.  This could potentially put the water
needs of half a million people into the hands of a small number of riparians—a
dangerous outcome.  The worst case scenario is that the Franco-American
decision, which was perpetuated by Heldermon, “created a right for riparians
to unreasonably speculate in water at the expense of reliable municipal water
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supplies.”   The City of Oklahoma City strongly agrees that this is110
“especially critical to the general welfare of the State in times of drought . . .
where people are faced with water shortages and investment in additional
water reservoirs and facilities are essential for survival and growth.”   The111
danger and instability of riparianism  stems from the idea that riparians would
be placed in a position to assert “bargaining leverage to gain a favorable
settlement from a potentially affected municipality”  like Oklahoma City and112
others not built along a large water source.
Public utility providers are also dramatically affected by the instability
created by the questionable validity floating along with riparian rights.
Oklahoma Gas & Electric (OG&E) is a wholly owned subsidiary of OGE
Energy Corp. and has been providing dependable electric service to
Oklahomans since 1902, currently serving approximately 750,000
customers.   A reliable water supply is indispensable to providers such as113
OG&E, especially given that most of their water supply comes from
appropriative rights secured through permits.   “Four of OG&E’s six electric114
generating facilities rely either partially or entirely on stream water provided
by eleven . . . stream water permits totaling 297,746 acre-feet per year.”115
Accounting for individual riparian rights jeopardizes the state’s largest utility
providing energy to the people, creating a direct impact on the welfare of the
state.  The “[e]nergy generated and delivered by OG&E is Oklahoma’s life-
blood,” and to deliver energy, OG&E needs an “appropriative water rights
system [that] provides water supply reliability, as opposed to the instability
and uncertainty associated with riparian systems.”116
Some of the state’s largest industries—agriculture and the oil and gas
industry—may experience even greater impacts.  The state’s agricultural
sector, represented by The Oklahoma Farm Bureau, strongly criticized the
Franco-American decision  and to this day opposes the instability of117
common law riparian rights.   The Oklahoma Farm Bureau (OFB) is “[an118
organization] of farm and ranch families united for the purpose of analyzing
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their problems, and formulating action to achieve educational improvement,
economic opportunity, and social advancement [and serves as] the voice of
agricultural producers at all levels.”   Although many of the 162,000 OFB119
member families are themselves riparian landowners, the OFB firmly supports
the appropriations system of water use management.   OFB members “utilize120
their riparian rights in various ways including domestic uses and as authorized
appropriators, [therefore, declaring the appropriations statutes]
unconstitutional is particularly significant . . . because it leaves riparian owners
in a state of uncertainty and their property interests will be adversely affected
by this uncertainty.”   The OFB, representing a large contingent of riparian121
owners, is arguing that a dual system of riparian rights and appropriative rights
would in fact be detrimental to riparian landowners.  Even further, the OFB
advocates that it should be exclusively a system of appropriations,  a far cry122
from the “unconstitutional taking without just compensation” argument that
opponents of the appropriations system build it up to be.
The uncertainty rising in the wake of the Heldermon decision is likely to
have consequences beyond the agricultural sector.  Oklahoma’s oil and gas
industry will likely suffer from the uncertainty as well.  Professor Drew
Kershen  explains the water needs of the oil and gas industry in his lecture123
“Water Law for the Oil & Gas Lawyer.”   In his lecture, Professor Kershen124
states that the oil and gas industry needs water for the drilling and fracturing
of wells, enhanced recovery to increase or maintain production, and, further,
for the operation of industrial facilities affiliated with the oil and gas industry
such as refineries.   Without a stable system of appropriations unencumbered125
by riparian rights, oil and gas companies would be forced to bargain and
contract with riparian landowners for the right to appropriate the use of their
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water.  This presents a further complication because under the archaic regime
of riparianism, the oil and gas company must continually ensure that this
contracted use does not interfere with the ever-moving target of reasonable use
by adjacent riparian landowners.  This process will inevitably lead to
expensive litigation and severe operational uncertainty within Oklahoma’s oil
and gas industry, which provides a potential disincentive for such companies
to invest in Oklahoma.   Professor Kershen indirectly discusses the126
uncertainty currently existing in Oklahoma’s water law by highlighting a
distinction between Oklahoma and Texas with regard to riparian rights.  He
notes that Texas has successfully abrogated and reaffirmed the extinguishment
of riparian rights, while also noting that Oklahoma still battles with
inconsistencies between Franco-American and persistent statutory repeals of
riparian rights.127
Unfortunately, the seriousness of the pragmatic and economic implications
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision did not ring loud enough in the
Heldermon decision.  The State of Oklahoma might find hope, however,
because the only proper interpretation of the appropriations statutes, which has
been left for another day—one inevitably soon to come—is for the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to uphold them as constitutional.
V. Overruling Franco-American—Clear Waters
The unsoundness of the Franco-American decision has plagued Oklahoma
water law long enough, and soon again the Oklahoma Supreme Court will
have the opportunity to steady the course of Oklahoma water law.  Whether
on rehearing of the Heldermon case or on the next inevitable dispute over
water rights, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should expressly overrule Franco-
American because the abrogation of riparian rights falls properly within the
bounds of the state constitution.  Contrary to the holding of Franco-American,
title 60, section 60 of the Oklahoma Statutes is constitutional, as well as title
82, sections 105.1A and 105.2(A).  The restriction of riparian rights by these
statutes constitutes a valid exercise of the state’s police power.  As the
Oklahoma Supreme Court itself recently stated:
It is a basic principle that water is a natural resource, which the
state may regulate for the health, welfare and safety of the people.
The Legislature may exercise its police power to protect the state’s
water irrespective of the rights of private owners of the land most
immediately concerned.  For the health, welfare and safety of its
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citizens, the Legislature may regulate a landowner’s use and
enjoyment of water resources to prevent waste and infringement on
the rights of others.128
Riparian landowners do not own the water.  To the contrary, stream water
is public water, and “[t]he state may either reserve to itself or grant to others
its right to utilize these streams for beneficial purposes.”   By enacting the129
appropriations’ statutes the legislature has simply exercised its constitutional
right to provide for the welfare of the people.  As the United States Supreme
Court stated in United States v. Rio Grande, “as to every stream within its
dominion a State may change this common-law rule, and permit the
appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes as it deems wise.”130
Further, “the magnitude of diminution necessary to invalidate a law on its face
[as unconstitutional] is a regulatory denial of ‘all economically beneficial or
productive use’ of the property.”131
As Professor Allison aptly stated in his review of the Franco-American
decision: “Property often comes in the form of a bundle of entitlements, but
‘the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not viewed as a taking because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.’”   Although the 1963132
amendments may have somewhat diminished the breadth of riparian rights,
they did not deny riparian landowners this right in its entirety, but rather
merely reduced the breadth of the right from reasonable use to domestic use.
Oklahoma is not the first state to encounter the constitutional questions
omnipresent with the introduction of an appropriations system.  However,
most states have upheld an appropriations system as within the state’s
constitutional police power.  Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington have all concluded riparian rights may be extinguished in favor
of a unitary system of appropriations.   A Nebraska Supreme Court decision133
in a case remarkably similar to Heldermon marks the most notable recent
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action favoring the appropriations system.  In Koch v. Aupperle,  the134
Nebraska Supreme Court addressed a dispute between neighboring landowners
involving the use of stream water flowing through two properties.  Koch, a
downstream landowner, filed suit against Aupperle to enjoin the construction
of an upstream dam that inhibited the flow of water used in a farm pond
constructed on Koch’s property.   Neither Koch nor Aupperle had affected135
any kind of appropriative right to the use of water in the unnamed stream,136
and both appeared to assert rights as riparian landowners.  However, “[s]ince
1895, Nebraska law governing [the use of water] has been statutory” as
opposed to the pre-1895 regime of common law riparianism.   Nebraska’s137
approach to abrogating riparian rights looks strikingly similar to the approach
taken by Oklahoma:
[W]hile the 1895 irrigation act abrogated the common law of
riparian rights in favor of the current system of appropriation, it did
not abolish existing riparian rights with respect to parcels of land
severed from the public domain prior to April 4, 1895, the effective
date of the act.  Such rights could be established by showing that
“by common law standards the land was riparian immediately prior
to the effective date” of the act and that it had not subsequently lost
its riparian status as a result of severance.  Thus, riparian rights
which had vested prior to the effective date of the 1895 act were
preserved, but no new riparian rights could be acquired after that
date.138
Nebraska, like Oklahoma, afforded riparian landowners a chance to
maintain their riparian rights by essentially appropriating their uses prior to the
abrogation of all riparian rights.  Nebraska, however, has gone a step further
to abrogate even domestic riparian uses—a use that Oklahoma chose to
preserve for riparian landowners.  Addressing a lower court opinion that “goes
on to recognize that the right of the downstream user to ‘use water’ from the
stream ‘for domestic purposes’ was ‘superior’ to the upstream appropriator’s
rights,” the Nebraska Supreme Court expressly held that such an opinion was
“unwise” and disapproved.   Ultimately neither Koch nor Aupperle were139
entitled to the use of the water because neither affected its appropriation, and
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the court found that neither party held title to land that was preserved as
riparian prior to 1895.140
While the Nebraska Supreme Court faced virtually the same dispute as the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Heldermon, it clearly thought it perfectly
constitutional to not recognize any riparian uses—even domestic
uses—because neither party had affected any such rights prior to 1895.  Thus,
while Oklahoma struggles to find it constitutional to abrogate any riparian
rights, at least one state has had no problem finding it constitutional to
abrogate nearly all riparian rights.
Finally, the Oklahoma appropriations statutes are constitutional because it
is logical to construe the 1963 amendments, as well as their companion
statutes, as constitutional.  One maxim of statutory interpretation provides that
“[e]very reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute, and the same will be upheld unless its conflict
with the Constitution is clear and certain.”   This rule of construction appears141
to be overwhelmingly evident in the case of the appropriations statutes.  Other
states’ interpretations of almost identical statutes as constitutional provides an
open channel for such interpretation in Oklahoma.  Further, “[t]his rule is
particularly applicable and the presumption is especially strong when the
statute has been long acquiesced in and has been treated as valid by the various
departments of government.”   Oklahoma has acquiesced in the142
appropriations statutes’ current state for nearly seventeen years.  It should be
noted this period of acquiescence dates back to the Franco-American decision,
which was preceded by thirty years of acquiescence itself.  This timeline
effectively eliminates any future claims that riparian landowners were not
placed on notice that their rights were changing, as asserted in Franco-
American.  Further, various departments and branches of government treat the
statutes as valid.  Clearly the legislature believes the statutes are constitutional,
as evidenced mostly by their persistent action to repeal riparian rights in the
face of judicial opposition.  Not only does the legislature understand this, but
the state executive does as well.  The Oklahoma Attorney General filed a brief
addressing the constitutionality of the appropriations statutes in Heldermon,
stating:  “the restriction of riparian water rights set forth in 82 O.S. §§ 105.1A
and 105.2(A) is a valid exercise of the state’s police power that does not rise
to the level of a compensable taking.”   The Attorney General concluded by143
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squarely opposing the holding of Franco-American.   It appears that the144
Oklahoma Supreme Court is the only bottleneck keeping the appropriations
system from flowing freely.
VI. Conclusion
For years the instability of riparian water rights, persistent repeals by the
legislature, and consistent rejection of the legislature’s statutory schemes by
the judiciary have muddied Oklahoma water law.  A system of sole riparian
rights would provide certainty but not stability for the general welfare, for it
does not provide for the water needs of the arid regions of the state.  A dual
rights system purportedly makes the best of both worlds but, in reality,
provides only continued pragmatic and economic uncertainty.  There appears
to be one obvious answer to clear the water, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
is the judicial body vested with the power to clarify the law.  Currently, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has remanded the Heldermon case to the Caddo
County District Court for rehearing with instructions that the OWRB be
properly notified of the action.   Whether Mr. Heldermon and Mr. Wright145
decide to pursue the action further with the involvement of the OWRB is
immaterial in the grand picture.  If not continued by Heldermon and Wright,
the dispute will inevitably rise again—and rise again soon—between adjacent
stream water users.  Only then, because of Heldermon, the parties will know
that they must involve the OWRB in the matter, and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court must finally rule on the appropriation statutes’ constitutionality.  At its
next opportunity, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should overrule its Franco-
American decision with a proper constitutional interpretation turning
Oklahoma back in the direction of stable economic development and water law
certainty.
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